Time Limits: The Effects on Welfare Use and Other Consumption-Smoothing Mechanisms by Mazzolari, Francesca & Ragusa, Giuseppe
D
I
S
C
U
S
S
I
O
N
 
P
A
P
E
R
 
S
E
R
I
E
S
Forschungsinstitut 
zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Time Limits: The Effects on Welfare Use and 
Other Consumption-Smoothing Mechanisms
IZA DP No. 6993
November 2012
Francesca Mazzolari
Giuseppe Ragusa
 
Time Limits: 
The Effects on Welfare Use and Other 
Consumption-Smoothing Mechanisms 
 
 
Francesca Mazzolari 
Centro Studi Confindustria 
and IZA 
 
Giuseppe Ragusa 
Luiss University 
 
 
 
Discussion Paper No. 6993 
November 2012 
 
 
 
IZA 
 
P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  
Fax: +49-228-3894-180   
E-mail: iza@iza.org 
 
 
 
 
 
Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
The IZA research network is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 
available directly from the author. 
IZA Discussion Paper No. 6993 
November 2012 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Time Limits: The Effects on Welfare Use and 
Other Consumption-Smoothing Mechanisms* 
 
We use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation covering the period 1989-
2006 to investigate the impact that time limits on receipt of Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families have on female-headed family outcomes, including welfare use, employment and 
living arrangements. The effects of time limits depend on the stock of remaining months of 
eligibility, which in turn depends on the state time limit and on family’s welfare use since the 
policy was implemented. Since the latter is potentially endogenous to current outcomes, we 
form a prediction of remaining eligibility based on state rules and observable family 
characteristics. For families who are predicted to have hit the limit, we find evidence of 
enforcement of the policy, which causes monthly income from welfare to drop by an average 
of $250. This loss is not offset by increases in other income sources: not only there is no 
significant change in earnings (despite a sizable increase in the likelihood that the mother 
works), but also income from other transfer programs (such as SSI and Food Stamps) 
decreases – resulting in increasing rates of deep poverty among these families. Additional 
analyses suggest that doubling up is a way for families who timed out of welfare to share 
housekeeping expenses. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J20, H53 
  
Keywords: welfare, time limits, consumption-smoothing 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Francesca Mazzolari 
Centro Studi Confindustria 
Viale dell’Astronomia, 30 
00144 Roma 
Italy 
E-mail: f.mazzolari@confindustria.it  
 
                                                 
* The authors thank Caroline Danielson for very helpful discussions on data issues, and James 
Sullivan, Melissa Schettini Kearney and other participants at the NPC-Census conference “The Survey 
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP): Research on Health Insurance, Welfare and Child 
Support” (Washington DC, October 3, 2008) for comments and suggestions. This project was 
supported with a grant from the National Poverty Center at the University of Michigan with funds 
provided by the U.S. Census Bureau, Housing and Household Economics Statistics Division. The 
opinions and conclusions expressed herein are solely those of the author(s) and should not be 
construed as representing the opinions or policy of the NPC or of any agency of the Federal 
government. 
 2 
I. Introduction 
Of all the U.S. welfare reform developments of the 1990s, the elimination of the 
entitlement status through the imposition of time limits on welfare receipt is among the most 
radical changes relative to previous policy. Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children 
(AFDC) program, all single-parent families with at least one child under age 18 could receive 
benefits as long as they satisfied some income and wealth eligibility criteria. In contrast, the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) 
prohibits states from using federal Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) funds to 
provide benefits beyond a 60-month lifetime limit. Many states have opted for even shorter 
limits.1 
Time limits might affect welfare use through both mechanical and behavioral effects. The 
direct mechanical effect arises from the fact that a family that reaches the limit should be 
dropped from the rolls (if the limit is enforced). Even before limits become binding, there 
might be behavioral responses of recipients and eligibles: forward-looking families may reduce 
their current welfare use in order to preserve their welfare eligibility as insurance against a 
negative event in the future (Grogger and Michalopoulos 2003, GM hereafter; Swann, 2005). 
Most of the empirical literature has focused on how time limits affect welfare use before they 
actually become binding, and has found some support for the existence of behavioral 
responses. Largely because of data limitations, very few studies have attempted at estimating 
                                                            
1 Moffitt (2003) provides a summary of the changes from AFDC to TANF. For reviews of the economic 
literature on the effects of the reform on welfare use, see Blank (2002), and Grogger, Karolyn and 
Klerman (2002). For a survey of state time limit policies, see Bloom et al. (2002). 
 3 
the degree of enforcement of time limits. Even less is known on the outcomes of families 
hitting the limit and being dropped from the rolls. 
Both the mechanical and behavioral effects of time limits depend on the stock of remaining 
months of eligibility, that in turn depends on (i) the state time limit – expressed in terms of 
available months of eligibility over a family lifetime, and on (ii) family’s welfare use since the 
policy was implemented. To define this crucial determinant of take-up and eligibility under 
time limits, this paper uses data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). 
Because of its longitudinal design and collection of information on monthly welfare use, 
remaining months of eligibility can be partly recovered in the SIPP from a family’s transitions 
into and out welfare observed during the sample period.2 However, since the SIPP consists of 
several separate panels, in-sample information must be complemented with information from 
the retrospective questions on past welfare use asked at the beginning of each panel. Using this 
approach and pooling data from the 2001 and earlier SIPP panels, Mazzolari (2007) estimates 
that time limits decreased welfare use by 25 percent between 1996 and 2003, with around 
twenty percent of the reduction due to behavioral responses, and the rest due to families hitting 
the limit.  
This paper extends previous work on the effects of time limits in several important ways. 
First, by including in the analysis data from the 2004 SIPP panel, we observe families through 
December 2006. It was not until the early 2000s that the first group of women who were 
continuously on welfare since TANF was enacted began to hit the 60-month time limit set in 
                                                            
2 The Current Population Survey, on the contrary, has limited information on duration of cash 
assistance. 
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many states. As the share of the population hitting the limit grows, there are more opportunities 
to assess the degree of enforcement of the policy and its effects. Second, we contribute to the 
existing literature by evaluating the effects of time limits on a variety of outcomes other than 
welfare use, such as employment and other income sources potentially available to families 
banking or losing TANF eligibility. As such, the analysis help assessing whether time limits (i) 
promoted families’ transition from welfare to work, (ii) made them dependent on other kinds of 
transfers (e.g., from other government programs), or (iii) made families worse off and 
increased their material hardship. Finally, since information on recipiency history collected at 
the beginning of each SIPP panel is not always sufficient to recover welfare use since time 
limit implementation (and the problem is more serious in the 2004 panel), from a 
methodological point of view we improve on previous work in the way we forecast remaining 
months of eligibility as of the time an individual first enters a SIPP panel. Specifically, we do 
so by fitting a model for past welfare use on a sample drawn from the end of the previous 
panel. In addition, we use cumulative administrative counts on welfare cases to improve our 
predictions. 
II. Time limit policies 
A. The federal time limit policy 
PRWORA prohibits states from using federal TANF funds to provide assistance to families 
with an adult recipient for more than 60 cumulative months.3 In practice, though, the federal 
                                                            
3 The “clock” for the federal 60-month lifetime limit started when each state implemented the TANF 
program (between September 1996 and July 1997). 
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time limit is not a limit on benefit receipt for individual families; rather, it is a funding 
constraint that shapes state policy decisions (Bloom et al., 2002). As a matter of fact, 
PRWORA replaced a matching fund arrangement under AFDC, in which federal funding 
moved up and down with state funding, with a system in which states are given federal block 
grants and, as residual claimants, considerable discretion in how to allocate them. Moreover, 
the federal limit does not apply to state funds – which gives states even broader flexibility in 
designing time-limit provisions. As a result, under PRWORA states can establish a 60-month 
time limit, a shorter time limit, or no time limit at all. They also have discretion in setting 
exceptions to the federal time limit, including circumstances under which a month of TANF 
assistance does not count towards the limit (exemptions) and circumstances under which 
TANF assistance may be continued even though a family has reached their limit (extensions). 
Exemptions from the federal limit can generally be granted by states under one of the 
following three circumstances.  First, the federal time limit does not apply to cases in which no 
adult is included in the welfare grant (“child-only cases”). Second, a family may be exempt 
from accrual of months under the federal five-year time limit based on an approved welfare 
reform waiver policy.4 Third, families receiving assistance from state-only funding are not 
subject to the federal time limit.5  
                                                            
4 A state may have received a waiver under the former AFDC program that authorized it to implement a 
time limit on cash assistance. If the TANF time limit was inconsistent with the state’s waiver time limit, 
the state was allowed to follow its waiver policy rather than the TANF policy until the expiration of the 
waiver. A dozen states filed certifications to follow a waiver policy, claiming inconsistencies that 
typically involved the exemption or extension policies under a state’s waiver. 
5 States can choose to segregate some or all of their state “maintenance-of-effort” (MOE) funds from 
federal funds and/or can create a separate state program (SSP) funded solely with state MOE dollars. 
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As regards extensions, states can use the federal TANF block grant to extend assistance 
beyond 60 months to up to 20 percent of the state caseload, including child-only cases. 
PRWORA allows the states to extend assistance based on hardship. States can also finance 
benefits to a family beyond the 60-month limit using state-only funding.  
B. State time limit policies 
States have used their flexibility under the federal law to adopt a wide variety of time limits 
that differ not only in length, but also in other ways. Two states (Vermont and Michigan) 
decided to impose no limit at all.6 All other states implemented some kind of time limit policy. 
Families accrue months toward a state time limit starting from the date of implementation of 
the policy in the state, which in 15 states differs from the date of TANF certification (Table 1). 
Twenty-four states have adopted the simple PRWORA standard of a 60-month lifetime 
limit, while five states impose a lifetime limit shorter than 60 months (ranging between 24 and 
48 months). Eleven states impose not only a lifetime limit (of 60 or less months) but also 
"intermittent limits" that are implemented either by limiting individuals to receive no more 
than x months of receipt in every y months of calendar time, or by obliging recipients to stay 
out of the program for z months after receiving benefits for x months. One state 
(Massachusetts) imposes no lifetime limit, but only intermittent limits. Finally, eight states 
have relaxed the time limits implicit in PRWORA by adopting "reduction" rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
The 60-month federal time limit does not apply toward assistance funded with segregated funds or 
through an SSP. 
6 Vermont operated under a waiver, now expired. Michigan has implemented a 48-month limit effective 
October 1, 2007, for individuals participating in the state’s Jobs Education and Training program. 
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termination policies (six have lifetime limits, while two have only intermittent limits). A 
reduction limit is a limit only for adults, so that children can continue to receive benefits 
beyond 60 months. 
In the empirical exercise presented in this paper, we follow state time limit policies in 
defining the date of implementation (  
! 
T s ) and the number of months of eligibility available 
under time limits (Ns). In particular, unless otherwise noted, Ns is set to be equal to the most 
binding time limit imposed in the state (that is, the intermittent time limit if in place). 
III. The effects of time limits 
Time limits could affect individual behavior in several ways. First, even before limits 
become binding, forward-looking families may reduce their current welfare use in order to 
preserve their welfare eligibility. So, women who have already started to receive welfare may 
be persuaded to find jobs and leave the rolls faster to avoid using up their months of eligibility. 
For the same reason, people who are working and off welfare might be more likely not to enter 
the rolls. The existence of an incentive to bank welfare eligibility for the future is conditional 
on several assumptions. First, banking incentives can only arise if there is no borrowing or 
saving, as in the GM model, or in the presence of a high enough benefit reduction rate – the 
rate at which other income is taxed in the welfare benefit formula (Fang and Keane, 2004). 
Another crucial assumption for the existence of banking behaviors is that the future matters. 
Evidence supporting this assumption is provided by Swann (2005), who estimates a high 
discount factor (ranging from 0.81 to 0.84) for women in a dynamic model of welfare use, 
work and marriage choices. A further requirement is that welfare eligible individuals are aware 
of the existence of time limits and of how many periods they have left. As documented in 
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Bloom et al. (2002), the state time-limit policy is generally communicated to recipients when 
they enroll, and in many states the number of months remaining on a recipient’s clock is 
routinely announced with each welfare check. Despite these practices, on data from the 2002 
National Survey of America’s Families, Zedlewsky and Holland (2003) find that 16 percent of 
welfare recipients report that they were not told they had a time limit, and another 21 percent 
report they were told but that they did not know for how many more months they could receive 
benefits.  
Time limits may also discourage women from ever participating in a welfare program for 
reasons other than banking effects. Stigma arising from receipt of welfare benefits has been 
proposed as an explanation for the low take-up rate among eligible individuals (Moffitt 1983). 
If stigma depends heavily on whether one has ever received benefits, then welfare eligible 
individuals may decline to ever make use of the program if the years of eligibility are 
shortened enough.  
Finally, women might not respond to time limits at all until their benefits are canceled, at 
which point they might be more likely to go to work to replace their lost income. However, 
long-term recipients may have skill deficits and personal and family problems that make it 
impossible for them to work steadily. If so, time limits would cut off benefits of people who 
cannot replace cash assistance with earnings or other income, and, as a result, they would cause 
material hardship for these families.  
Empirical evidence 
Soon after enactment, some analysts were projecting that as many as 2 million families and 
3.8 million children would hit the 5-year federal limit (Duncan et al. 2000). These projections, 
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however, were static; that is, they did not take into account changing economic conditions or 
welfare use behaviors in the post-reform period. Because of the strong economy of the late 
1990s and of the many new rules that made welfare less generous, these calculations likely 
overstated the number of families hitting the limits. Moreover, at the time of PRWORA 
enactment making predictions on the number of involuntary exits due to time limits was 
complicated by the fact that this number depended on how states would implement the policy, 
that is, (i) whether they would exempt some or all families from time limits, and (ii) whether 
they would actually cancel the welfare grants of families reaching the limit, or would rather 
extend their eligibility. 
Largely because of the scarcity of data on flows onto ad off of welfare, whether TANF time 
limits have resulted in a substantial number of involuntary exits remains an open question.7 
The approach taken in Bloom et al. (2002) and Farrell et al. (2008) to answer this question is to 
count the number of families who timed-out as reported by states. They estimate that the total 
number of cases closed due to time limits by December 2001 and by September 2005 was, 
respectively, 93,000 and 257,000. For a number of reasons, however, these figures are likely to 
underestimate the number of families who had their benefits canceled due to time limits.8 
                                                            
7 More broadly, we have very limited information on the ways in which time limits are actually being 
implemented and are affecting families. We know more only about a few specific states. For example, 
Bitler, Hoynes and Gelbach (2006) find that the 21-month time limit policy included in Connecticut’s 
Jobs First program was binding for a substantial number of women, and that income was reduced for a 
non-trivial share of the income distribution after time limits took effect. For the case of a county in 
Minnesota, Pavetti and Kauf (2006) describe the problems faced by families who are hitting the limits. 
8 For example, these figures do not include cases that were closed just prior to reaching time limits or 
after receiving an extension. See Bloom et al. (2002) for a discussion of the limitations of the data. 
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Most of the empirical literature on the effects of time limits has focused on how time limits 
affect welfare use before they actually become binding. Several early studies using only cross-
state variation in the timing of implementation of time limits estimate that they had no 
significant effect on welfare use (CEA 1997, 1999; Moffitt 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000; 
Ziliak et al. 2000). A shortcoming of these studies is that they constrain the effects of time 
limits to be independent of personal characteristics. On the contrary, the GM’s model predicts 
that the "option value" of banking welfare eligibility is decreasing in the stock of remaining 
months of eligibility and increasing in the time horizon over which benefits may be used (that 
is, given the AFDC/TANF categorical restriction, as long as minor children live in the home). 
The most recent empirical literature tests for and provides evidence consistent with reduced-
form predictions of the GM’s model. GM –on data from a reform demonstration in Florida– 
and Grogger (2002, 2003, 2004) –on nationally representative data– allow for age-dependence 
in the effects of time limits to test the prediction that behavioral effects should be greater 
among families with younger youngest children, because they have longer horizons of 
categorical eligibility. They find that time limits have statistically significant and economically 
sizable negative effects on welfare use. For example, Grogger (2004) estimates that behavioral 
responses to time limits account for 12 to 13 percent of the 1993-1999 decline in welfare use. 
A shortcoming of identifying the effects of time limits through age-dependent effects is that 
this approach is theoretically valid only at the moment of time limit implementation, while as 
time passes it only correctly identifies the incentive to bank benefits perceived by people who 
have not used any of them. Fang and Keane (2004) estimate a reduced-form specification for 
welfare utilization that captures the effects of remaining eligibility through the inclusion of the 
minimum stock of benefits that a woman would possess if she always received welfare since 
her clock started. Time limits are found to explain 11 percent of the overall 1993-2002 decline 
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in welfare use among single-headed families. However, also in this approach the 
characterization of the effects of time limits worsens as time passes since the limit is 
introduced. 
Using SIPP data, Mazzolari (2007) improves the characterization of the incentives and 
constraints faced by potential recipients under time limits by including in the analysis 
information on the number of remaining months of eligibility. This is essential to test the 
structural predictions of the GM model on the behavioral effects of time limits, but also to 
separately identify the mechanical effects of this provision. The estimation results indicate that 
time limits decreased welfare use by 25 percent between 1996 and 2003, with only around 
twenty percent of the reduction due to behavioral responses, and the rest due to families hitting 
the limit. 
There is a very scarce literature on the effects of time limits on outcomes other than welfare 
use. Relying on the fact that the effects of time limits should vary by the age of the youngest 
child in the family, Grogger (2003) estimates that this policy had substantial effects both on 
welfare use and employment, but somewhat lesser effects on labor supply, and little if any 
effects on earnings and income. When comparing states with short and long time limits in the 
early 2000s, Leonard and Mas (2005) provide evidence of a noticeable increase in the infant 
mortality rate in the early 2000s in the former group of states, but not in the latter—occurring 
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primarily among low-educated women with at least one previous live-birth, that is, a group 
who could have plausibly timed out of TANF.9  
IV. Empirical model 
C. The effects of time limits on welfare use 
On samples of single mothers drawn from the SIPP panels, we estimate the following 
model for welfare use:  
( ){ ( ) ( )} itstsitsititsititsstsitits Year0SIHSIHS0I)TI(tVXp(1) ε++η+≤δ+≥γ+<<α≥+φ+λ=
 
where pits takes on the value one if woman i living in state s received AFCD/TANF benefits in 
month t; Xit and Vts are respectively sets of socio-demographic characteristics and state-level 
policy and economic factors, and 
! 
"(.) is the indicator function (which is unity whenever the 
statement in parentheses is true, and zero otherwise). Sits is the remaining stock of months of 
welfare eligibility and Hit is the eligibility horizon. Specifically,
  
! 
Sits = Ns " pijsj= T s
t"1
#  where Ns is 
the state time limit and   
! 
T s is the date when the state started to count months toward the limit; 
and   
! 
Hit = (12 *18) "Ait
y , where   
! 
Ait
y  denotes the age in months of the youngest child.  
Equation (1) allows testing the following hypotheses on the effects of time limits: 
                                                            
9 This result is consistent with a positive effect of maternal participation in the AFDC program on the 
well being of new-born children ( Currie and Cole, 1993). 
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(i) Unconstrained hypothesis: When the clock is running (  
! 
t " T s), individuals with 
remaining stock of benefits not smaller than their eligibility horizon (  
! 
St " Ht ) should behave as 
if time limits were not implemented ( 0=γ ). 
(ii) Banking hypothesis: If they are forward-looking, individuals with incomplete coverage 
under time limits –that is, with a remaining stock of benefits less than the eligibility horizon 
( tt HS0 << )– should have an incentive to bank their welfare eligibility for periods of adverse 
wage shocks, and so should participate in welfare less than people not facing time limits 
( 0<α ). 
(iii) Enforcement hypothesis: Most state welfare laws do include the option of extensions, 
usually because the family faces a particular hardship or because the parent is unable to find 
work despite "diligent efforts." Most states also allow for exemptions, primarily for recipients 
that are incapacitated or are victims of domestic violence (Bloom et al., 2002). As such, the 
degree of enforcement of time limits is an empirical question. If time limits are enforced, then 
exhausting benefits relative to the statewide time limit (  
! 
St " 0) should predict a drop in the 
probability of using welfare ( 0<δ ). 
The strategy for identifying the effects of time limits is based on the interaction of state, 
time and individual variation. First, each state s has a specific total stock of benefits available 
denominated in months of benefit receipt (Ns), and started to count months toward the limit at a 
specific date (  
! 
T s ). Second, individuals may live in a period when time limits are not 
implemented (  
! 
t < T s ); when limits are implemented (  
! 
t " T s ), there is variation in the length of 
the exposure to the policy, defined by the number of periods elapsed since implementation 
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(  
! 
t "T s). Finally, individuals have different eligibility horizons (Hit) and remaining eligibility 
(Sits) – which depend on the age of their children and their past welfare use. 
As apparent from the sample restriction to single mothers and from the definition of the 
eligibility horizon in terms of ages of living children, the identification strategy assumes that 
marital status and fertility decisions are exogenous to time limit policies. This assumption is 
justified by the fact that the empirical literature on the effects of welfare reform on family 
composition decisions is mixed, and for some inconclusive.10 However, the lack of evidence 
from the available data is also consistent with marriage and fertility patterns being more 
sluggish and resistant to change than welfare (or work) behavior. If more findings became 
available about significant effects of welfare reform on family composition decisions, then the 
exogeneity assumption would turn less innocuous.  
There are several issues to be dealt with in the identification of the effects of time limits in 
Equation (1). First, to separate the effects of time limits from the collective effect of other 
reform components (such as work requirements), we exploit the fact that the dates since time 
limits started to be counted do not overlap completely with either waiver or TANF 
implementation dates. In practice, we include in Vts two welfare reform variables: (i) a dummy 
that takes the value of one if the state in which a woman lives has a “major” statewide waiver 
in effect in month t (the indicator is turned off when TANF is implemented in the state) and (ii) 
a dummy that is equal to one in all months after the state first implemented its TANF 
                                                            
10 See Grogger, Karolyn and Klerman (2002) and Blank (2007) for reviews. 
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program.11 In order to disentangle the effects of time limits from those of other factors that 
influence welfare use, Vts also includes the monthly unemployment rate, the AFDC/TANF 
maximum monthly benefit for a family of three, and the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) 
maximum payment.12 
Equation (1) also includes state fixed effects (ηs) and state linear and quadratic trends, 
which are meant to address the issue of policy endogeneity. This would arise if unobservable 
determinants of welfare use that vary between states and over time (included in the error term 
  
! 
" its ) were correlated with the state level policy variables controlled for in Equation (1).. 
Finally, including the actual remaining stock of benefits Sits in a model that explains current 
welfare use pits would cause serious endogeneity concerns. This is because Sits depends on 
individual welfare participation in previous periods, which is likely to be correlated with some 
unobservable factors that also explain pits. For example, a woman with unobserved barriers to 
work is more likely to have received benefits in the past and to have a low Sits, but she is more 
likely to be receiving benefits today as well. Also, a woman who used welfare at time 
! 
t "1 
because of a negative wage shock starts period t with a depleted stock of benefits, but she is 
also more likely to use welfare because of state dependence (Chay, Hoynes and Hyslop 1999). 
Both cases would result in a relationship between Sits and pits of the opposite sign than that 
                                                            
11 For dates and sources, see Table 1. The table reports the dates in which states (1) received waivers 
from the AFDC rules (in the early 1990s), (2) they implemented their TANF programs (between 
September 1996 and January 1998), and (3) started to count months towards the limits (Ts). 
12 The variables included in Vts vary by state and time, some at the monthly level (unemployment rate 
and waiver and TANF dummies), the others on a yearly basis. The EITC maximum credit also varies by 
family size 
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predicted by the banking hypothesis. Moreover, given that states may grant extensions to 
people who have exhausted their benefits but can prove to the welfare office to be facing a 
particular hardship or not to be able to find work despite diligent efforts, the event 
! 
Sits " 0  is 
likely to be endogenous to some unobserved factors that also make it more likely to be granted 
to continue to receive benefits. So, we expect the estimate of δ to be upward biased.  
Following Mazzolari (2007), we address the endogeneity of S by isolating variation in 
remaining months of eligibility at each point in time arising from differences in the timing and 
nature of state time limit policies, individual exposure to time limits and an exogenous 
prediction of average welfare use based on socio-demographic characteristics. In particular, we 
start from noticing that welfare use counting toward the limit can be expressed as the fraction 
of time a woman actually spent on welfare (  
! 
kit ) of the total time she might have spent since her 
state started her clock (Eits). As a result, we can write remaining eligibility as 
  
! 
Sits = Ns " kit #Eits , where Eits equals the minimum between the number of months elapsed since 
the implementation of time limits (  
! 
t "T s) and the age in months of a woman’s oldest child 
(  
! 
Ait
o ), that is   
! 
Eits = min{(t "Ts ),Aits
o }. As long as the legislative environment is taken as 
exogenous, Eits identifies an exogenous source of variation in Sits. The fraction of time 
individual i actually spent on the rolls (kit), however, is likely be endogenous to pits. To address 
this issue, we simulate remaining benefits as itssits Ek
~NZ ∗−= , where k
~  is a presumably 
exogenous prediction, empirically obtained as the average welfare recipiency rate predicted at 
the national level and in the pre-reform period on the base of some socio-demographic 
characteristics. Specifically, the results presented in Section VII are obtained using a set of four 
weights that represent average national pre-reform welfare participation by education (two 
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categories: (i) less than a high school degree, (ii) high school degree or more) and number of 
children (two categories: (i) one or two children, (ii) more than two children).13  
A final identification issue arises from the possibility that other determinants of welfare use 
may have effects that vary by children’s ages, or by the other characteristics that define k~ . To 
allow for this case, we generalize Equation 1 and allow the variables in Vts to interact with the 
age of the youngest and the oldest child, as well as a woman’s education and number of 
children.  
To summarize, variants of Equation (1) are estimated by instrumental variables (IV), where 
the three time limit variables (which are functions of Sits) are instrumented by the same 
functions but defined on Zits. Estimation results from first stage regressions (reported in Table 
5) show that the instrumental variables are statistically significant predictors of the endogenous 
variables. The F-statistics on the joint significance test of the three instruments is remarkably 
high in the equations for banking effects and for the non-binding case (Columns 1 and 2), 
while hitting the limit (column 3) – the less frequent event (2 percent of the sample falls in this 
category) – appears to be the most difficult one to predict: the F-statistics is much lower than in 
the other cases, but still largely above the critical value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997). 
 
                                                            
13 There are many possible sets of weights we can calculate using the socio-demographic characteristics 
that have the highest predictive power for pre-reform welfare participation (number of children, 
education, race, marital status, age). For a discussion of robustness checks for the choice of k, see 
Mazzolari (2007). Also, it must be noted that the single weights k=0 and k=1 would correspond to and 
share the problems of the approaches taken (in a reduced-form specification) by Grogger (2002, 2003, 
2004) and Fang and Keane (2004) respectively. Also, setting k=0 would prevent testing the 
enforcement hypothesis. 
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D. The effects of time limits on other income-generating activities 
Beyond welfare use, we use specification (1) to test the effects of time limits on other ways 
a single mother may have to generate income and, more broadly, to finance consumption for 
herself and her children, including (i) employment and earnings, (ii) participation in other 
welfare programs (e.g., Food Stamps, Supplemental Security Income), (iii) income sharing 
from cohabitation. 
For families banking their months of eligibility, we would expect to observe changes in 
these other variables that at least partly offset the income losses from giving up welfare. Since 
the banking hypothesis implicitly assumes that families have other alternative ways to finance 
consumption while saving eligibility, this analysis may serve as an indirect test for this 
hypothesis. Second, assessing which alternative sources of income a family that is plausibly 
banking benefits is relying on is an important policy question, since it sheds light on whether 
the reform succeeded in making benefits perceived as temporary while promoting a transition 
from welfare to work, or instead made families dependent on other kinds of transfers or forced 
them to potentially disruptive changes in living arrangements. 
For families running out of eligibility, the analysis is informative of the alternative ways to 
finance consumption that are available to them. This analysis is important for two reasons. 
First, it may serve as a way to assess whether TANF benefits were crowding-out other income 
sources. This is a crucial policy issue—that has received only limited empirical investigation in 
the pre-reform period (Gruber, 2000). Second, assuming we had a complete enough list of 
income generating activities other than welfare transfers, the analysis would indirectly shed 
light on whether hitting the limit is likely to be associated with changes in the material 
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hardship for single mothers and their children. There are three main issues that hinder our 
ability to learn about the material well-being of families from this approach. First, even if the 
SIPP is a very rich survey, we cannot assume it includes information on all of the possible 
sources of income available to families. Second, income tends to be underreported. Finally, 
after-tax income should be measured. Consumption would certainly be a better measure of 
well-being than income. In their study of well-being changes for single mother headed families 
over the 1990s, Meyer and Sullivan (2008) show how changes in measured income sharply 
differ from changes in consumption. Unfortunately, the small sample sizes of the U.S. 
Consumer Expenditure surveys hinder our ability to complement the present analysis with a 
study of the effects of time limits on consumption.14  
V. Data and variable construction 
We use data from the 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 2001 and 2004 SIPP panels, whose 
combined sampling periods extend from October 1989 to December 2006. Each panel 
constitutes an independent sample of the U.S. population. Data are collected at four-month 
intervals (known as “waves”); however, at each interview, respondents are asked to provide 
information covering the four months since the previous interview, so that the data are on a 
monthly basis. Until 1993, a new panel was started annually, so that there were usually several 
panels in progress simultaneously—each one including on average 8 to 9 waves (that is, 
spanning 32 to 36 months of data). After 1993, the SIPP was redesigned to include larger non-
                                                            
14 The SIPP collects information on direct material well-being measures (such as difficulty paying 
utilities or rent), but only in a topical module asked once per panel. 
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overlapping panels. The 1996 and 2004 panels include 12 waves, while the 2001 panel 
includes 9 waves.15 
The sample of analysis is restricted to single mothers (that is, the primary target for cash 
assistance under the U.S. law) between the ages of 15 and 55 living in states that are separately 
identified in the SIPP.16 The resulting sample is given by 544,234 monthly observations on 
20,511 women.17 
The first advantage of using samples drawn from the SIPP is the availability of data on 
monthly receipt of income from AFDC/TANF programs. This is the appropriate variable of 
interest given that welfare eligibility is determined on a monthly basis and time limits are 
expressed in terms of available months of eligibility. Also, the fact that respondents are 
interviewed every four months reduces misreporting due to recollection problems that can be 
serious in yearly datasets. Underreporting, however, is still present in the SIPP (Jabine et al. 
1990; Card et al. 2004). If underreporting changes over time, then time series comparisons are 
problematic. In particular, the estimates in the present study would be biased in the same 
direction as the predicted effects of time limits on welfare use if elimination of the entitlement 
for benefits increased underreporting for TANF participation. We explore this issue in the next 
section. 
                                                            
15 As of the time of this writing, only the first 9 waves of the 2004 panel were available. 
16 The nine excluded states are AK, ID, IA, ME, MT, ND, SD, VT and WY. 
17 Given that previous work shows that respondents tend to give the same response for all four months 
within a wave (Blank and Ruggles 1996), we have tested the robustness of our results to restricting the 
sample to observations pertaining to the month before the interview. 
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E. Assessing underreporting of welfare participation in SIPP 
An indicator of measurement error in SIPP-reported welfare use is the discrepancy between 
cases receiving welfare assistance estimated in the SIPP and administrative caseload data. 
Figure 1 illustrates this comparison. Data on monthly counts of welfare cases are from the 
Office of Family Assistance (OFA) within the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services’ Administration for Children and Families.18 OFA collects these data from states. 
Starting in fiscal year 2000, a majority of states set up parallel cash assistance programs, one 
for federally-funded and one for state-funded cases, and started to report them separately to 
OFA. The blue line in Figure 1 plots monthly administrative counts that are aggregated at the 
national level and include both federally- and state-funded cases.  
The other lines plot the number of cases estimated in the SIPP, both by panel and across 
panels. The SIPP-based estimates of welfare cases are systematically lower than the 
administrative counts, but overall they track fairly well the caseload surge in the early 1990s 
and its subsequent drop. Even an eyeball comparison, however, reveals changes in the 
discrepancy between administrative and SIPP-based estimates both within and across SIPP 
panels. There is a clear tendency for the discrepancy to rise within panels. One explanation for 
this pattern is that individuals with a higher probability of welfare use may have higher attrition 
rates, so that welfare cases are downward biased in later months of each panel. Indeed, in the 
1990-1993 SIPP panels, Card, Hildreth and Shore-Sheppard (2004) find that attrition rates are 
higher for people in poverty. Selective attrition patterns imply that trends in welfare cases 
                                                            
18 Available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_archive.html. 
 22 
estimated within a panel are downward-biased relative to trends across panels. This can clearly 
explain some of the differences in estimated counts across the 1990-1993 panels. Also, in light 
of the 1996 redesign—that abandoned the overlapping panel structure—we should not expect 
underreporting patterns to be constant over the sample period that is relevant for our analysis. 
Finally, when comparing estimates from the more recent panels, a striking feature of Figure 1 
is that the discrepancy from administrative data appears to be significantly lower (and more 
stable) in the 2004 panel than in the previous ones.  
Figure 2 restricts the comparison between administrative and SIPP-based estimates to the 
case of single-parent families. While the qualitative patterns are similar, the magnitude of the 
discrepancy between the two sources is significantly larger in this case. This suggests that 
underreporting of welfare use in the SIPP is more pronounced among the population of interest 
for this study. 
Since in our paper identification of the effects of time limits stems from state policy 
variation, it is crucial for us to assess whether underreporting is systematically related to the 
timing of state time limit implementation. To investigate this issue, we estimate the following 
model for the discrepancy between administrative counts and SIPP-based estimates calculated 
by month and state, Dts: 
(2)    tstssts Year+)TI(tD ε++η≥=  
Estimation results (reported in Table 2) show that the discrepancy is negatively correlated 
with the time limit implementation dummy, that is, underreporting appears to be systematically 
lower when individuals face time limits. This implies that changes in underreporting are 
expected to bias our estimates against finding a negative effect of time limits on welfare use. 
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Importantly, when including state and year effects (column 3)—also included in equation (1)—
the magnitude of differences in underreporting before and after time limit implementation 
shrinks significantly.  
F. Imputing remaining months of eligibility  
Both the mechanical and behavioral effects of time limits depend on the stock of remaining 
months of eligibility, which in turn depends on family’s welfare use since the policy was 
implemented. The SIPP provides the most valuable source of data to define this crucial 
determinant of take-up and eligibility under time limits. Information on individual prior 
welfare participation since time limit implementation can be obtained in the SIPP using both 
in-sample information and retrospective questions asked at the beginning of the panel. 
Individuals sampled in the 1990-1993 panels (whose sampling periods extend to December 
1995) did not face time limits, since states implemented the policy after December 1995.19 As 
regards the 1996 panel—that covers the period December 1995-February 2000—the number of 
months of individual welfare use since the clock started to tick (Mits) can be calculated using 
in-sample information. We then build remaining benefits Sits as the difference between the state 
limit (Ns) and Mits.20 In the 2001 and 2004 panels (whose sampling periods are, respectively, 
                                                            
19 The only exception is Arizona that started to count months towards the limit in November 1995. 
20 It must be noted that defining Sits as the difference between the state limit and Mits does not take into 
account the fact that states may allow exemptions that temporarily stop the clock for some welfare 
recipients. In this case, welfare participation occurs without depleting the stock of remaining months of 
eligibility. Even if states define broad categories to which exemptions can be applied, there are at least 
two reasons why it is not feasible to include this information in defining Sits. First, many categories are 
based on factors that the researcher cannot observe (such as being a victim of domestic violence, 
disability status, caring for a disabled family member). Second, welfare workers have large discretion in 
granting exemptions to recipients who apply for them (Bloom et al. 2002). As a result, we can only 
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October 2000-December 2003 and October 2003-December 2006), we impute Mits as of the 
calendar month that corresponds to the first time individual i is interviewed (M0i) on the base 
of (i) information from retrospective questions asked at the beginning of each panel, (ii) a fitted 
model for Mits as of the last wave of the previous panel, and (iii) administrative data. We then 
impute the months of eligibility left in one’s clock as of the beginning of the panel as S0i = Ns - 
M0i. For later months, we update this variable based on in-sample information, that is, Sit = S0i 
– (months of welfare use from the 1st interview until t-1). 
Specifically, to impute M0i as of the beginning of the 2001 and 2004 panels we fit the 
following model: 
(3)    Mits = φp1 + φp2 Xits + φp2Wi + ηps + εits = φpYits      if Wi>0 
for individual-month observations as of the last interview (fourth reference month of the last 
wave) of panel p=1996, 2001. We then use the estimated coefficients φp to predict M0i as of the 
first interview (first reference month of wave 1) of panel 2001 and 2004, respectively. The 
prediction is based on a set of observable socio-demographic characteristics (Xi, including age, 
education and number of children), state dummies (ηs) and the number of months of welfare 
experience (Wi), which is gathered from in-sample information (at the end of the 1996 panel), 
information in the recipiency module (at the beginning of the 2001 and 2004 panels) or both (at 
the end of the 2001 panel). We use model (3) to forecast M0i at the beginning of panel 2001 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
define Sits abstracting from the existence of exemptions, and test for the extent to which they were 
eventually granted by estimating the relationship between having exhausted benefits (Sits≤0) and the 
probability of welfare use in month t. The limitation of this approach is that it does not allow to 
separately identify the extent of exemptions and extensions. 
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and 2004 only for those individuals with previous welfare experience (Wi>0). For individuals 
who have never been on welfare before, we set M0i=0. 
We also use administrative data to improve our imputation of M0i as of the beginning of 
panel 2001 and 2004. In particular, we forecast M0i not only using the estimated coefficients 
from model (3), but also including constraints implied by administrative counts of welfare 
cases. In practice, the procedure consists in framing the model as an overidentified moment 
restriction problem, and estimating it through the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). 
The first restriction is the usual orthogonality condition for Least Squares estimates. The 
second restriction is that the weighted sum of the predicted values must equal the cumulative 
counts since time limit implementation from the administrative data, net of an undercount of 1 
million single-parent cases per month (estimated from the data plotted in Figure 2). 
VI. Summary Statistics 
Table 3 reports summary statistics of the policy and economic variables (by year) included 
in the analysis. After peaking at 33 percent in 1993, the yearly average welfare participation 
rate across states drops slightly in 1994 and 1995, plummets to 25 percent in 1996, then 
continues falling steadily to reach 8 percent in 2002 and plateaus at this level through 2006. 
The sample period includes two economic downturns, captured by rising unemployment rates 
both in the early 1990s and in the early 2000s. In the period of analysis we also observe a 
significant erosion of the real value of the AFDC/TANF maximum guarantee and a sizable 
increase in the generosity of EITC maximum credits. State activity in experimenting with 
reforms of the AFDC program picks in 1995, when almost half of our sample is subject to 
some kind of waiver policy. The TANF federal rules, approved in August 1996, are 
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implemented by states between September 1996 and January 1998. As regards time limit 
policies, all states but Michigan and Vermont implemented them by July 1998. Individuals 
living in Vermont are dropped from the analysis, since this state was not separately identified 
in SIPP until the 2004 panel. Since Michigan placed no time limit on benefits through 2006, 
the fraction of individual-month observations not facing any time limit policy from 1999 on 
corresponds to the population in this state.  
Table 3 also reports the share of the sample facing non-binding limits (S≥H), the share that 
is entitled to fewer months of eligibility than their eligibility horizon (0<S<H) and the share 
that has already hit the limit (S≤0). Notably, the latter increases over time from 1.3 percent in 
1999 to 5.5 percent in 2006. There is evidence of a drop in 2004, which may at least partly be 
spurious to pooling data from two consecutive panels (the 2001 panel spans the period through 
December 2003, and the 2004 panel the period since October 2003). Both forecasting pre-panel 
welfare use as in Equation (3) and constraining the estimates to match the cumulative welfare 
caseloads from administrative data are found to shrink the discontinuity between panels, but 
there remains the concern that seam bias may be an issue here.21 
Table 4 provides summary statistics of family level characteristics, both in the full sample 
of families headed by single mothers aged between 16 and 55 (column 1), and separately for 
families who either do not face time limit policies (column 2), or, if they do, perceive more or 
                                                            
21 On the other hand, since the population of single mothers may change over time (some women exit 
the pool – when their youngest child turns 18 – and others enter it – at the time of their first out-of-
wedlock birth), the share of the sample hitting the limit may indeed decrease over time. However, the 
very sharp discontinuity in the series observed in 2004 when comparing within-panel estimates (and 
using only information provided in the recipiency history module to recover S0) suggests that seaming 
plays a role.  
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less binding constraints (columns 3 through 5). First, we notice some relevant differences in 
the socio-demographic characteristics across columns. Relative to the group of women not 
facing any time limit policy, single mothers who have used up all of their months of eligibility 
(S≤0) are less likely to have ever been married or to hold a high school diploma or higher, and 
are more likely to be black and to have more and younger children. On the contrary, women 
who have a positive number of months of eligibility left (S>0) tend to be more educated and 
non-Hispanic. Among them, there are sizable differences between women who face binding 
time limits (S<H) and those who don’t (S≥H). First of all, the latter have older children (13 or 
older) – a fact that arises mechanically from defining the eligibility horizon H as the number of 
months until the youngest child turns 18.22 Women in this group do not only have older 
children; they are older too, as well as more likely to be divorced. In addition, they have higher 
rates of college attendance and are significantly more likely to be white. The fact that this 
group of women has different socio-demographic characteristics relative to the one not facing 
time limits raises concerns on whether comparing the two can serve as a test for the 
“unconstrained hypothesis.” The differences also show the importance to specify (as we do) a 
flexible model where the effects of policy factors other than time limits, as well as of time-
varying economic factors, are allowed to vary by socio-demographic characteristics.  
Table 4 also reports the means of the outcome variables of interest. Among those women 
who hit the limit (S≤0), it is noticeable that 44 percent still receive income from welfare – 
suggesting that exemptions and extensions are widespread. However, this figure alone cannot 
                                                            
22 As opposed to the approach in GM and Grogger (2002, 2003, 2004), however, the child’s age cutoff 
can here be higher than 13, depending on the time limit imposed by the state (Ns) and the number of 
months on welfare use accumulated by the family. 
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be taken as evidence that time limits have not at all been enforced. First, the average monthly 
transfer received by this group is lower than for women not facing the limit: this may partly 
arise from the erosion of AFDC/TANF benefits in real terms over time (see Table 3), but is 
also consistent with binding “reduction” time limit policies. Second, we would expect families 
who have hit the limit to face unobservable barriers to work that not only made them more 
likely to use welfare in the past, but also more likely to be granted an exception. This is 
confirmed by a perusal of the other outcomes of these families. Both employment rates and 
earnings (if positive) are significantly lower than average, suggesting that women in this group 
not only face barriers that prevent them from working, but may also have very scarce skills that 
erode the returns they earn from work. Not surprisingly, this group has also high participation 
rates in other means-tested programs, such as SSI and Food Stamps, and very high rates of 
poverty and deep poverty. Because of the endogeneity between the likelihood to be granted an 
exception and unobservable characteristics that may directly affect the outcome of interest, in 
the next section we attempt to learn about the effects of time limit by first forming a prediction 
for hitting the limit that is based on observable (policy and family) characteristics, and then 
identifying the extent and the effects of enforcement for those who comply with this prediction. 
VII. Estimation Results 
Welfare use 
Regression results of the effects of time limits on welfare use and TANF benefits appear in 
Table 6. We only report the coefficients of the three time limit variables in Equation (1), but 
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all specifications include controls for socio-demographic characteristics23 and state-level policy 
and economic factors; state and year dummies; state-specific linear and quadratic trends; 
interactions between economic and policy variables and the age of the youngest and the oldest 
child, and the number of children, mother’s education, and their interaction. Standard errors are 
adjusted to allow heteroskedasticity and correlation across families living in the same state.24  
The importance of using only exogenous variation in the remaining stock of benefits Sits is 
emphasized by the differences between OLS and IV estimates. First, as opposed to the OLS 
estimates (column 1), the IV results (column 2) support time limit enforcement, and are also 
consistent with the main prediction of a dynamic model of welfare use on the existence of 
banking effects: women facing incomplete coverage under time limits (0<S<H) participate in 
welfare less than in the absence of this policy. Noticeably, though, enforcement effects are 
economically more significant than banking effects. Also, as we would expect, the difference 
between probability of welfare use across women not facing the policy and women 
unconstrained under time limits (S≥H) is not statistically significant. 
The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is the monthly dollar amount of family income 
from AFDC/TANF. Like the results for welfare use, the IV estimates are consistent with time 
                                                            
23 Mother’s age (linear and quadratic); dummies for marital status (never married, separated, divorced 
or widow), race (white, black, Asian), Hispanic origin, foreign-born status and education (less than 7th 
grade, 7th to 8th grade, 9th grade, 10th grade, 11th grade, high-school degree, at least some college 
education); number of children less than 6, between 6 and 12, and older than 12; dummies for the age of 
the youngest and oldest child (less than 3 years old, between 3 and 5, between 6 and 12, older than 12).  
24 Given that there are repeated observations for the same individual, standard errors should be clustered 
at the individual level as well. Since this is nested in the state clustering, we opt for clustering at the 
higher level (Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan, 2004). 
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limit enforcement. On average, having hit the limit decreases benefits by around $250. On the 
contrary, both unconstrained women and those facing incomplete coverage do not experience 
economically significant changes in their welfare transfers.  
As discussed in Section II, states have used their flexibility under the federal law to adopt a 
wide variety of time limits that differ not only in length, but also in other ways. In our 
empirical exercise, the state time limit Ns corresponds to the most binding time limit imposed 
in the state (that is, the intermittent time limit if in place) and no distinction has been made so 
far between reduction and termination limits. Table 7 reports IV estimation results of the 
effects of time limits on welfare use separately run for families living in states with different 
time limit policies. As expected, we find evidence of enforcement only in the subsample of 
individuals facing termination limits (column 1), while families hitting a reduction limit 
continue to receive benefits at higher rates than families not facing the policy (column 2). We 
also find evidence that the mechanical caseload reduction due to this policy only arises in states 
that imposed lifetime or intermittent limits shorter than 60 months (column 4), while in states 
implementing the standard 60-month lifetime limit individual welfare use is affected only, if 
any, through behavioral effects (column 3). 
Employment and Earnings 
The IV estimation results on the effects of time limits suggest that this policy did reduce 
welfare use and welfare benefits, because single mothers were dropped from the rolls and, even 
if at a smaller extent, also because some of them started to decrease welfare use before hitting 
the limit. But did employment for these women increase? Table 8 reports regression results for 
the effects of time limits on the family head’s labor force status (whether employed at any time 
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during the month, or whether out of the labor force) and earnings from work (in levels and in 
logs). The estimates suggest that women in families that have hit the limit increase their 
employment by 21 percentage points—a sizable effect (column 1). The corresponding negative 
effect in column 2 indicates that women entering the labor force explain the increase in 
employment. However, earnings for women hitting the limit do not increase on average, 
neither when incorporating the work-no-work decision (column 3), nor when studying the 
effects on women that already had some labor earnings (column 4). The results are consistent 
with earnings for women previously out of the labor force being lower than average, but also 
with poorer matches (lower paying jobs) for women motivated to accept jobs (that they may 
have not accepted otherwise) in response to their benefits being cut. 
As regards women facing incomplete coverage, there is evidence of increased employment 
and also increased earnings – consistent with women taking up jobs more frequently when they 
know the clock is running, and in particular jobs that are better than average matches. 
Other transfers from social programs 
Table 9 reports estimation results for family’s participation in other government programs, 
that is, Food Stamps and Supplemental Security Income. Several papers have looked at the 
impact of welfare reform on programs other than AFDC/TANF. For example, Danielson and 
Klerman (2006) find that welfare reform was correlated with the drop in food stamp caseloads 
in the mid-1990s. On the contrary, Schmidt and Sevak (2004) provide evidence of shifting 
from AFDC/TANF to SSI, with female-headed households in states aggressively pursuing 
welfare reform in more recent years more likely to have SSI income. 
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As shown in Table 9, we find that hitting the limit is not only associated with being cut 
from TANF benefits, but also with a decrease in transfers from other programs. As regards 
Food Stamps, there is both a sizable drop in the probability to participate in the program and in 
the monetary value of the transfer (which decreases by almost $50 per month). As regards SSI, 
even if the drop in use is not statistically significant, we find evidence of a drop in the dollar 
amount received of almost $80 per month. These findings seem to suggest that being dropped 
from TANF is correlated with losing access to other programs too, raising the concern about 
the ability of low-income families dropped from the rolls to maintain themselves.  
The probability to receive SSI or food stamps decreases as well for women facing 
incomplete coverage. However, the magnitude of these changes is negligible compared to the 
case when time limits bite. 
Poverty, household income and living arrangements 
The concern that families hitting the limit and likely to be dropped from the rolls may be 
struggling financially is supported by evidence of an increase in their likelihood to be living in 
poverty, especially in deep poverty (columns 1 and 2, Table 10). However, there is no 
evidence of a significant decrease in household income (column 3). This finding, together with 
evidence that hitting the limit is associated with an increase in the probability that another 
adult, beyond the single mother head, is living in the household (column 4), suggests that 
doubling up may be a way for families who timed out of welfare to respond to the need of 
greater income sharing.  
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As opposed to the case when time limits bite, poverty rates are found to decrease among 
families facing incomplete coverage – suggesting that, if indeed the ticking clock moved these 
families out of welfare and into work, this also lifted them out of poverty. 
VIII. Conclusions 
Since the reforms of the 1990s overhauled the U.S. welfare system, a large amount of 
research has tried to evaluate the various effects of the new rules on the behavior and well-
being of low-income families. Yet, it is striking how many questions about the effects of these 
policy changes remain unanswered (Blank 2007a). This paper is aimed at increasing our 
understanding of the effects of the introduction of time limits on welfare receipt, one of the 
changes we know the least about – largely because of data limitations. In fact, we have very 
limited information even on the ways in which this policy is actually being implemented by 
states. Closely related to the issue of how states are utilizing time limits is the raising concern 
about “disconnected” women, that is, that growing segment of single mothers who report 
themselves as neither working nor on welfare (Turner, Danziger and Seefeldt 2006; Blank 
2007b; Blank and Kovak 2009). 
In this paper, for female-headed families who are predicted to have hit the limit, we find 
evidence of enforcement of the policy (which causes monthly income from welfare to drop by 
an average of $250), as well as evidence of sizable increases in the likelihood that the mother 
works at some point during the reference month. Despite the increased likelihood of entering 
the labor force, however, the loss of income from welfare is not offset by increases in other 
income sources: not only there is no significant change in earnings, but also income from other 
transfer programs (such as SSI and Food Stamps) decreases – resulting in increasing rates of 
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deep poverty among these families. Analyses at the household level, however, show that there 
is no drop in household income, probably because families are doubling up as a response to the 
need of more income sharing.  
Time limits were designed to create strong incentives for women to seek work and leave 
welfare. Some evidence that the policy promoted families’ transition from welfare to work 
without increasing their material hardship is indeed provided in this paper as regards cases 
when the limit does not bite, that is, for families who are allegedly leaving the rolls because of 
“banking” incentives. Our findings for families hitting the limit, however, underscore the 
importance of more research on the ways states are implementing time limits, and on whether 
and how states are effectively identifying needy families that should be shielded from the 
penalties. Specifically, it would be crucial to assess whether states find ways to assist women 
who are forced off TANF to continue using the services still available to themselves and their 
children. To this regard, more work to understand the interaction between government 
programs after welfare reform is clearly warranted. 
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Table 1: Features of State Time Limit Policies and 
Date of Implementation of Major Statewide Waivers, TANF Programs and Time Limits
State in place 
duration 
(months) in place duration (months)
most binding 
TL (months)
reduction 
TL [i] waiver [ii] TANF TL [iii]
Date Families first 
Exceed(ed) limit [iv]
Alabama 1 60 0 60 0 Nov-96 Nov-96 Nov-01
Alaska 1 60 0 60 0 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-02
Arizona 0 none 1 24 in 60 24 1 Nov-95 Oct-96 Nov-95 Nov-97
Arkansas 1 24 0 24 0 Jul-94 Jul-97 Jul-98 Jul-00
California 1 60 0 60 1 Dec-92 Jan-98 Jan-98 Jan-03
Colorado 1 60 0 60 0 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-02
Connecticut  [a] 1 21 1 21 0 Jan-96 Oct-96 Jan-96 Oct-97
Delaware [a] 1 60 1 48 ineligible for 96 48 0 Oct-95 [2] Mar-97 Mar-97 Oct-99
DC 1 60 0 60 0 Mar-97 Mar-97 Oct-98
Florida [a] 1 48 1 36 in 72 24 0 Jun-96 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-98
Florida [b] 1 48 1 24 in 60 36 0
Georgia 1 48 0 48 0 Jan-94 Jan-97 Jan-97 Jan-01
Hawaii 1 60 0 60 0 Feb-97 Jun-97 Dec-96 Dec-01
Idaho 1 24 0 24 0 Aug-96 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-99
Illinois 1 60 0 60 0 Nov-93 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-02
Indiana 1 24 0 24 1 May-95 [3] Oct-96 May-97 Jul-97
Iowa 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-93 Jan-97 Jan-97 Jan-02
Kansas 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-01
Kentucky 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-01
Louisiana 1 60 1 24 in 60 24 0 Jan-97 Jan-97 Jan-99
Maine 1 60 0 60 1 Jun-96 Nov-96 Nov-96 Nov-01
Maryland 1 60 0 60 1 Mar-96 Dec-96 Jan-97 Jan-02
Massachusetts 0 none 1 24 in 60 24 0 Nov-95 Sep-96 Dec-96 Dec-98
Michigan 0 none 0 . Oct-92 Sep-96 ---- ----
Minnesota 1 60 0 60 0 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-02
Mississippi 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-95 Jul-97 Oct-96 Oct-01
Missouri 1 60 0 60 0 Jun-95 Dec-96 Jul-97 Jul-02
Montana 1 60 0 60 0 Feb-96 Feb-97 Feb-97 Feb-02
Nebraska 1 48 1 24 in 48 24 0 Oct-95 Dec-96 Dec-96 Dec-98
Nevada 1 60 1 24 ineligible for 12 24 0 Dec-96 Jan-98 Jan-00
New Hampshire 1 60 0 60 0 Jun-96 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-01
New Jersey 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-92 Jul-97 Apr-97 Apr-02
New Mexico 1 60 0 60 0 Jul-97 [6] Jul-97 Jul-02
New York 0 60 [1] 0 60 1 Nov-97 Dec-96 Dec-01
North Carolina 1 60 1 24 ineligible for 36 24 0 Jul-96 Jan-97 Aug-96 Aug-98
North Dakota 1 60 0 60 0 Jul-97 Jul-97 Jul-02
Ohio 1 60 1 36 ineligible for 24 36 0 Jul-96 Oct-96 Oct-97 Oct-00
Oklahoma 1 60 0 60 0 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-01
Oregon 0 none 1 24 in 84 24 1 Feb-93 Oct-96 Jul-96 Jul-98
Pennsylvania 1 60 0 60 0 Mar-97 Mar-97 Mar-02
Rhode Island 1 60 0 60 1 May-97 May-97 May-02
South Carolina 1 60 1 24 in 120 24 0 May-96 Oct-96 Oct-96 Oct-98
South Dakota 1 60 0 60 0 Jun-94 Dec-96 Dec-96 Dec-01
Tennessee 1 60 1 18 ineligible for 3 18 0 Sep-96 Oct-96 Oct-96 Apr-98
Texas [a] 1 60 1 12 ineligible for 60 12 0 Jun-96 [4] Nov-96 Sep-97 Sep-98
Texas [b] 1 60 1 24 ineligible for 60 24 0 " " " Sep-98
Texas [c] 1 60 1 36 ineligible for 60 36 0 " " " Sep-98
Utah 1 36 0 36 0 Jan-93 Oct-96 Jan-97 Jan-00
Vermont 0 none 0 . Jul-94 Sep-96 ---- ----
Virginia 1 60 1 24 ineligible for 24 24 0 Jul-95 [5] Feb-97 Oct-97 Oct-99
Washington 1 60 0 60 0 Jan-96 Jan-97 Aug-97 Aug-02
West Virginia 1 60 0 60 0 Jan-97 Jan-97 Jan-02
Wisconsin 1 60 0 60 0 Jan-96 Sep-97 Oct-96 Oct-01
Wyoming 1 60 0 60 0 Jan-97 Jan-97 Jan-02
Notes: [i] A reduction time limit (as opposed to the general case of termination time limit) means that the child portion of the welfare benefit continues after time limits exhaustion.
[ii] Implementation of major statewide waivers.
[iii] Effective date for time limits (actual counting date for statewide time limits). 
[iv] Denotes the month following the date families could potentially accumulate the maximum number of months of TANF assistance.
Connecticut [a]: In Oct 2001  CT imposed a new 60-month time limit that allows fewer exceptions than the previous 21-month limit, and that counts benefits received since Oct 1996.
Delaware [a]: In Januray 2000, Delaware introduced a new 36-month lifetime limit.
Florida [a] applies to women with age under 24 and who did not finish high school. Florida [b] applies to other women.
TX [a] applies to women with at least a high school diploma. TX [b] applies to women who completed 3 or more years of high school but do not hold a HS diploma.  TX [c] others
[1] New York state allows those reaching a 60-month limit to transition to a state funded Safety Net Program that provides the same benefits but only partly (20%) in cash.
[2]  Delaware began implementation of its termination time limit with a small number of cases in October 1995; the policy became universal in March 1997.
[3]  IN began implementation of 24-month time limit policy for "job-ready" non-exempt cases in July 95; beginning May 97 the 24-month limit was expanded to all non-exempt cases.
[4] Texas' 12, 24, or 36 month time limit began in one county in June 1996 and was expanded to the entire state by September 1997. 
[5] Virginia's termination time limit began in five counties in July 1995 and was expanded to the entire state by October 1997.
[6] New Mexico implemented TANF again in 1998 after its first 1997 plan was ruled unconstitutional.
Sources: CEA (1999), Bloom et al. (2002), Bitler et al. (2004), ASPE webpage (http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/waiver-Policies99/W1tim_limt.htm#N5)
Intermittent Time LimitLifetime Limit Implementation
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Table 2: Correlation between underreporting of welfare use in SIPP and time limit 
implementation 
 (1) 
bivariate model 
(2) 
state fixed 
effects 
(3) 
state and year 
fixed effects 
 
A. All Welfare cases 
    
TL implementation   
! 
I(t " T s )  -8,311.9*** -8,165.9*** -2,562.7* 
 (752.2) (441.1) (1,412.0) 
Constant 24,978.9*** 13,044.4*** 11,038.7*** 
 (555.5) (1,422.6) (2,214.9) 
Observations 8,400 8,400 8,400 
R-squared 0.01 0.67 0.68 
    
B. Single-parent cases 
    
TL implementation   
! 
I(t " T s )  -15,368.4*** -14,293.8*** -4,059.8*** 
 (1,055.6) (413.5) (1,290.4) 
Constant 41,839.2*** 23,332.9*** 13,629.1*** 
 (779.6) (1,333.7) (2,024.2) 
Observations 8,400 8,400 8,400 
R-squared 0.02 0.86 0.87 
Note: The dependent variable is the difference between administrative counts and SIPP-based estimates 
of welfare cases by state and month, from October 1989 to December 2006, in the 42 states separately 
identified in SIPP. 
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Table 3: Summary statistics of policy and economic variables  
Year 
Welfare 
use 
Unemp. 
rate 
Max 
welfare 
benefit 
Max EITC 
credit 
  Implementation   Time limits 
  Waiver TANF 
Time 
limits   
Not 
Binding  
S ≥ H 
Banking   
0  <S < H 
Bite  
S ≤ 0 
1989 27.4% 5.45 $488 $1,152  0 0 0  0 0 0 
1990 29.7% 5.69 $478 $1,148  0 0 0  0 0 0 
1991 30.2% 6.96 $460 $1,395  0 0 0  0 0 0 
1992 31.0% 7.66 $449 $1,521  20.3% 0 0  0 0 0 
1993 33.1% 7.08 $431 $1,602  27.3% 0 0  0 0 0 
1994 32.6% 6.29 $419 $2,417  32.3% 0 0  0 0 0 
1995 31.6% 5.75 $407 $2,734  46.2% 0 0  0 0 0 
1996 24.8% 5.50 $385 $2,836  33.3% 45.1% 7.9%  1.0% 7.3% 0.0% 
1997 20.5% 5.04 $377 $2,868  13.7% 86.3% 59.6%  9.4% 51.5% 0.1% 
1998 15.7% 4.57 $373 $2,910  0 100% 94.6%  15.4% 79.2% 0.4% 
1999 12.4% 4.28 $367 $2,898  0 100% 95.6%  15.0% 79.6% 1.3% 
2000 9.5% 4.10 $367 $2,835  0 100% 96.1%  14.1% 79.4% 2.7% 
2001 8.8% 4.79 $356 $2,859  0 100% 96.5%  13.4% 80.1% 3.2% 
2002 7.8% 5.87 $352 $2,911  0 100% 96.7%  14.2% 78.3% 4.3% 
2003 7.8% 6.07 $346 $2,915  0 100% 96.8%  14.5% 76.9% 5.5% 
2004 7.9% 5.61 $352 $2,893  0 100% 96.0%  14.7% 77.5% 3.9% 
2005 7.4% 5.19 $338 $2,867  0 100% 96.3%  15.0% 76.8% 4.4% 
2006 7.5% 4.71 $329 $2,874  0 100% 96.4%  14.8% 76.2% 5.5% 
             
Total 21.6% 5.79 $399 $2,387   12.5% 50.2% 43.7%   6.8% 37.3% 1.2% 
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Table 4: Summary statistics of individual and family level variables 
  Full sample   Time Limit Implementation 
   No Yes 
       
Not Binding 
S ≥ H 
Banking  
0<S < H 
Bite 
S ≤ 0 
Number of observations 544,234  297,321 37,037 203,156 6,719 
       
Single mother's characteristics       
     Age 33.63  33.12 43.28 32.70 33.06 
     Marital status (excluded: never married)      
       Woman separated 19.4%  19.8% 17.9% 19.0% 19.0% 
       Woman widow 4.3%  4.7% 8.7% 2.9% 0.9% 
       Woman divorced 37.1%  37.4% 58.8% 33.2% 20.5% 
     Highest educational attainment (excluded: tenth grade or less)    
        Eleventh grade 9.8%  10.9% 5.2% 8.7% 16.0% 
        High School graduate 37.8%  40.3% 32.0% 35.1% 30.4% 
        At least some years of college 38.7%  33.6% 53.5% 44.4% 26.6% 
     Race and origin       
        Black 33.9%  34.8% 25.3% 33.8% 47.1% 
        Asian 2.2%  2.2% 3.0% 2.2% 1.3% 
        Hispanic 24.1%  29.7% 13.0% 17.4% 24.3% 
        Foreign-born 11.9%  12.8% 11.0% 10.7% 11.6% 
Number of children       
     0-5 years old 0.58  0.61 0.00 0.63 0.66 
     6-12 years old 0.71  0.70 0.00 0.85 1.11 
     13-17 years old 0.49  0.48 1.31 0.36 0.58 
Age of the youngest child 7.16  6.95 15.33 6.00 6.66 
Age of the oldest child 9.73  9.55 15.98 8.83 10.76 
       
Welfare use 21.6%  29.7% 3.6% 11.3% 44.4% 
Monthly welfare income $85  $124 $10 $37 $109 
Monthly welfare income >0 $394  $418 $280 $323 $246 
Employed 65.6%  60.6% 81.5% 71.4% 38.0% 
Out of the labor force 27.8%  32.3% 14.4% 22.5% 48.9% 
Woman's Earnings $1,088  $974 $1,743 $1,170 $389 
Woman's Earnings if >0 $1,696  $1,641 $2,176 $1,678 $1,087 
Any food stamps income 30.8%  35.6% 9.5% 25.8% 69.3% 
Food stamp income $70  $83 $15 $55 $168 
Any SSI income 5.1%  4.8% 3.7% 5.3% 19.1% 
SSI Income $24  $22 $17 $25 $85 
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Poverty ratio 0-99% 39.6%  42.3% 18.4% 38.3% 72.8% 
Poverty ratio 0-49% 20.0%   20.8% 8.7% 20.0% 45.4% 
Whether other adults in the household 44.2%  44.3% 50.7% 43.3% 33.8% 
Household total income $2,306  $2,201 $2,954 $2,387 $1,252 
 
 
 
Table 5: First Stage regressions 
 
 
Variable 
I(0<S<H) 
 
(1) 
I(S ≥ H) 
 
(2) 
I(S ≤ 0) 
 
(3) 
    
I(0< Z < H) 0.956*** 0.047*** -249.054*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (23.483) 
I(Z ≥ H) 0.271*** -0.732*** 0.058*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) 
I(Z ≤ 0) -0.852*** 0.059*** -0.081*** 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.006) 
Constant 0.002 0.006 0.937*** 
 (0.011) (0.008) (0.044) 
    
F Test (joint significance) 115,336.9 7,555.3 90.1 
Prob > F 0.000 0.000 0.000 
    
Observations 544,234 544,234 544,234 
R-squared 0.91 0.82 0.18 
Notes: Predicted remaining benefits Z are defined using state time limits and exposure to time limits 
(calibrated by national average pre-reform welfare use by education and number of children). H 
denotes the eligibility horizon under time limits. Asterisks denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering across states. Estimates are weighted. 
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Table 6 
The effects of time limits on welfare use and dollar transfer amount 
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
 
Variable 
Welfare Use 
OLS 
(1) 
Welfare Use 
IV 
(2) 
TANF benefit ($) 
OLS 
(3) 
TANF benefit ($) 
IV 
(4) 
      
Enforcement I(S ≤ 0) 0.297*** -0.801*** 65.490*** -247.812*** 
  (0.011) (0.075) (3.561) (23.840) 
Banking I(0 < S < H) -0.002 -0.013*** 0.335 -2.953*** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (1.254) (1.319) 
Unconstrained I(S ≥ H) -0.020*** 0.014 0.284 10.481*** 
  (0.004) (0.008) (1.549) (1.662) 
Constant  0.122*** -0.080* 2.974 -3.939 
  (0.037) (0.043) (17.602) (17.656) 
      
Observations  544,234 544,234 544,234 544,234 
Notes: In the IV estimation, the three functions of remaining benefits S are instrumented by the same 
three functions of predicted remaining benefits Z, defined using state time limits and exposure to time 
limits (calibrated by national average pre-reform welfare use by education and number of children). H 
denotes the eligibility horizon under time limits. Asterisks denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering across states. Estimates are weighted. 
 
 
Table 7. The effects of time limits on welfare use by type of time limit policy 
 
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
 
 
Variable 
Termination TL  
 
IV 
(1) 
Reduction TL 
 
IV  
(2) 
60-month 
lifetime limit 
IV 
(3) 
Shorter lifetime limit 
or intermittent  
IV 
(4) 
      
Enforcement I(S ≤ 0) -1.148*** 0.496*** 0.000 -0.817*** 
  (0.099) (0.072) (0.000) (0.086) 
Banking I(0 < S < H) -0.021*** -0.009 -0.018*** -0.018*** 
  (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005) 
Unconstrained I(S ≥ H) 0.030*** 0.019 0.075*** -0.028*** 
  (0.006) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) 
Constant  0.252*** 0.263*** -0.094* 0.322*** 
  (0.050) (0.074) (0.052) (0.072) 
      
Observations  394,576 170,942 309,226 256,292 
The models in Columns 1 and 2 only include observations for states with termination or reduction time 
limits respectively. States adopting reduction time limits are: AZ, CA, IN, MD, NY, OR and RI. Model 
in Column 3 only includes observations for states imposing a 60-month lifetime limit, while model in 
Column 4 includes observations for states imposing lifetime limits shorter than 60-month (AK, CT, FL, 
GA, ID, IN, NE, UT) or intermittent limits (AZ, DE, FL, LA, MA, NE, NV, NC, OH, OR, SC, TN, TX, 
VA).  
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Table 8 
The effects of time limits on employment and earnings 
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
 
Variable 
Employed 
IV 
(1) 
Out of Labor Force 
IV 
(2) 
Earnings  
IV 
(3) 
Log Earnings  
IV 
(4) 
      
Enforcement I(S ≤ 0) 0.210*** -0.295*** -125.700 0.319 
  (0.073) (0.076) (193.674) (0.229) 
Banking I(0 < S < H) 0.024*** -0.028*** 69.300*** 0.018* 
  (0.004) (0.004) (13.224) (0.010) 
Unconstrained I(S ≥ H) -0.042*** 0.021*** 19.707 0.044*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (25.772) (0.015) 
Constant  -0.090** 0.944*** -1,219.8 4.825*** 
  (0.043) (0.045) (80.068) (0.111) 
      
Observations  544,234 544,234 544,234 354,213 
Notes: In the IV estimation, the three functions of remaining benefits S are instrumented by the same 
three functions of predicted remaining benefits Z, defined using state time limits and exposure to time 
limits (calibrated by national average pre-reform welfare use by education and number of children). H 
denotes the eligibility horizon under time limits. Asterisks denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering across states. Estimates are weighted. 
 
 
Table 9 
The effects of time limits on Food Stamps and SSI use  
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
 
Variable 
Food Stamps Use  
IV 
(1) 
Food Stamps Income ($) 
IV 
(2) 
SSI Use  
IV 
(3) 
SSI income ($) 
IV 
(4) 
      
Enforcement I(S ≤ 0) -0.215*** -47.546*** -0.061 -76.427*** 
  (0.077) (22.519) (0.046) (24.961) 
Banking I(0 < S < H) -0.021*** -2.435** -0.007*** -3.722*** 
  (0.004) (0.971) (0.002) (1.096) 
Unconstrained I(S ≥ H) 0.015*** 2.981** -0.016*** -7.698*** 
  (0.006) (1.303) (0.003) (1.780) 
Constant  -0.064 -127.626** -0.178*** -78.786*** 
  (0.040) (10.665) (0.026) (13.561) 
      
Observations  544,234 544,234 544,234 544,234 
Notes: In the IV estimation, the three functions of remaining benefits S are instrumented by the same 
three functions of predicted remaining benefits Z, defined using state time limits and exposure to time 
limits (calibrated by national average pre-reform welfare use by education and number of children). H 
denotes the eligibility horizon under time limits. Asterisks denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering across states. Estimates are weighted. 
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Table 10: The effects of time limits on family poverty rates, household income and living 
arrangements  
 
 
 
Hypothesis  
 
 
 
Variable 
Poverty ratio  
0-99% 
IV 
(1) 
Poverty ratio  
0-49% 
IV 
(2) 
Household 
Income ($) 
IV 
(3) 
Other adults living 
in the household 
IV 
(4) 
      
Enforcement I(S ≤ 0) 0.075 0.134* -29.909 0.387*** 
  (0.077) (0.080) (280.650) (0.074) 
Banking I(0 < S < H) -0.009** -0.020** 17.819 -0.026*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (24.713) (0.004) 
Unconstrained I(S ≥ H) -0.022*** 0.018*** 61.992 0.056*** 
  (0.007) (0.006) (41.197) (0.007) 
Constant  -0.309*** 0.247*** 3,867.009*** 1.440*** 
  (0.044) (0.043) (161.191) (0.045) 
      
Observations  544,234 544,234 544,234 544,234 
Notes: In the IV estimation, the three functions of remaining benefits S are instrumented by the same 
three functions of predicted remaining benefits Z, defined using state time limits and exposure to time 
limits (calibrated by national average pre-reform welfare use by education and number of children). H 
denotes the eligibility horizon under time limits. Asterisks denote coefficients significantly different 
from zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) level. Standard errors (in parentheses) account for 
heteroskedasticity and clustering across states. Estimates are weighted. 
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Figure 1 
 
Source: Data on monthly state-level counts of AFDC/TANF cases are from ACF and includes both 
cases funded with federal TANF block grants or state separate programs (ssp) 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_archive.html). For AFDC, only 
“basic cases” are counted. For TANF, one-parent and no-parent cases are summed. 
SIPP weighted averages for the period covered by multiple panels are obtained using adjustment factors 
that reflect the relative sample size of each panel. 
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Figure 2 
 
Source: Data on monthly state-level counts of AFDC/TANF cases are from ACF and includes both 
cases funded with federal TANF block grants or state separate programs (ssp) 
(http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/data-reports/caseload/caseload_archive.html). For AFDC, only 
“basic cases” are counted. For TANF, one-parent and no-parent cases are summed. 
SIPP weighted averages for the period covered by multiple panels are obtained using adjustment factors 
that reflect the relative sample size of each panel. 
 
